Estudio Bibliográfico de / A Bibliographical Study of: José M. Sevilla, Ragione narrativa e ragione storica. Una prospettiva vichiana su Ortega y Gasset. Introducción de Giuseppe Cacciatore. Guerra Edizioni, Perugia, 2002, pp. 269. I.S.B.N. 88-7715-615-5.

After reviewing the historical fortune of Nietzsche as a political thinker, it is discussed what aspects of his philosophy can be most useful for the deployment of a pluralist democracy, in the sense of political agonism claimed today by some of his interpreters. But the reasons why an articulation of democracy and aristocratic culture is coagulated in his philosophy are also pointed out. For this, the question of the agon in Nietzsche is approached and its discrepancy with the Schmittian idea (...) of the friend-enemy pair, as distinctive of the essence of the political, is pointed out, thus placing the Nietzschean critique of modernity in perspective. (shrink)

Estudio Bibliográfico de / A Bibliographical Study of: José M. Sevilla, Ragione narrativa e ragione storica. Una prospettiva vichiana su Ortega y Gasset. Introducción de Giuseppe Cacciatore. Guerra Edizioni, Perugia, 2002, pp. 269. I.S.B.N. 88-7715-615-5.

Estudio bibliográfico y crítico de / A bibliographical and critical study of: Vincenzo Vitiello, La favola di Cadmo. La storia tra scienza e mito da Blumenberg a Vico, Laterza , Bari, 1998. pp. 180.

Name der Zeitschrift: Nietzsche-Studien Jahrgang: 43 Heft: 1 Seiten: 195-199.

Concebir la nietzscheana voluntad de poder como amor es a la vez un desafío y un reconocimiento. A las páginas de esta obra se asoman las "Madres" de Fausto y los tristes héroes de Milan Kundera. Al fondo, quedamente y llena de gracia, se vislumbra la huella de Friedrich Hölderlin.

Sobre los pasajes concretos de la Historia authéntica, de Luis Francisco de Viana y Bustos y Joseph Juan de Laboraría, canónigos del Sacromonte de Granada, se evoca la condenación de la memoria que esta institución hace para la historia, del padre Ignacio de las Casas. Éste, jesuita granadino, morisco de nación, misionero con sus hermanos y trabajador social por donde pasó, campos en los que ganó merecido prestigio, se significó como acérrimo refutador de las invenciones de la Torre Turpiana y (...) Valparaíso de fines del siglo XVI. El arzobispo Pedro de Castro lo persiguió en vida y, luego, decidió para los siglos posteriores la estigmatización de su memoria, que implicaba el falseamiento y envilecimiento de su biografía. La Historia authéntica, defensorio escrito en 1756, es la mejor expresión del fanático cumplimiento de ese mandato del fundador carismático, siglo y medio después de los hallazgos. (shrink)

El presente artículo trata de presentar la edición que el Prof. Manuel Barrios Casares ha llevado a cabo del texto de Hugo Ball sobre Nietzsche, redactado en un principio en el marco de un proyecto de tesis doctoral entre 1909 y 1910. A la traducción y anotación del texto antecede un extenso prólogo sumamente interesante para su comprensión y contextualización. Hugo Ball, promotor del dadaísmo y amigo de Kandinsky, plasma en el texto el clima intelectual de la (...) recepción del pensamiento de Nietzsche entre las vanguardias artísticas europeas de principios del siglo XX. (shrink)

Ensayo bibliográfico de la obra de Manuel Barrios Casares, _La vida como ensayo y otros ensayos. Kundera, Benjamin, Ortega_ (Sevilla, Athenaica Ediciones, 2022).

Este artículo explora el valor que las nociones y estrategias espaciales pueden tener para transitar hacia una sociedad poscapitalista. La expansión planetaria del capital, conocida habitualmente como globalización, ha estado acompañada por la extensión planetaria de la urbanización, hasta el punto de que ambas resultan inseparables. Como ha sido reiteradamente teorizado por geógrafos y urbanistas como Henri Lefebvre, David Harvey o Manuel de Solà-Morales, la urbanización no es una súper estructura cultural, sino un factor de producción que ha actuado (...) como motor fundamental del desarrollo capitalista. La posibilidad de una sociedad poscapitalista requiere, por lo tanto, cuestionar la idea de urbanización y desarrollar categorías alternativas. Este artículo examina la noción de territorio y el valor del diseño territorial como agentes de cambio que permiten desarrollar una biopolítica positiva y nuevos vínculos entre condiciones y singularidades locales, procesos y problemas globales. (shrink)

El propósito de este estudio es reflexionar acerca de las aportaciones de la obra de M. Barrios Casares en el nuevo contexto hermenéutico en el que se encuentran los estudios nietzscheanos actualmente. El hilo conductor del estudio se articula en torno a la última publicación del filósofo sevillano, Tentativas sobre Nietzsche, cuyas líneas fundamentales son analizadas aquí. El segundo de los objetivos del presente trabajo reside en señalar algunos vínculos entre esta última publicación de M. Barrios y (...) su trabajo realizado anteriormente en el campo de la traducción, la edición y el ensayo. (shrink)

In her last known piece of work Lady Mary Shepherd’s Metaphysics (1832), Mary Shepherd writes that “mind, may inhere in definite portions of matter […] or of infinite space” (LMSM 699). Shepherd thus suggests that a mind – a “capacity for sensation in general” (e.g., EPEU 16) – may have a spatial location. This is prima facie surprising given that she is committed to the view that the mind is unextended. In this paper, we argue that Shepherd can consistently honor (...) both of these commitments. We argue, first, that even though finite minds, due to their unextendedness cannot, to use Shepherd’s term, ‘occupy’ space as material bodies do, such minds can nonetheless be said to have a spatial location in virtue of what we call their presence, or what Shepherd calls ‘inherence’, in a material body. Second, we argue that, in a similar way, the divine mind is present throughout the whole of space and is thus omnipresent. We then argue that, in contrast to finite minds, the divine mind does not require a body to be present in space. Rather, we contend, God’s omnipresence might be best understood in a ‘holenmerist’ sense, where the divine mind is wholly present in every part of creation. (shrink)

This paper examines Margaret Cavendish’s ecological views and argues that, in the Appendix to her final published work, Grounds of Natural Philosophy (1668), Cavendish is defending a normative account of the way that humans ought to interact with their environment. On this basis, we argue that Cavendish is committed to a form of what, for the purposes of this paper, we will call ‘deep ecology,’ where that is understood as the view that humans ought to treat the rest of nature (...) as something of intrinsic value. (shrink)

William Molyneux was born in Dublin, studied in Trinity College Dublin, and was a founding member of the Dublin Philosophical Society (DPS), Ireland’s counterpart to the Royal Society in London. He was a central figure in the Irish intellectual milieu during the Early Modern period and – along with George Berkeley and Edmund Burke – is one of the best-known thinkers to have come out of that context and out of Irish thought more generally. In 1688, when Molyneux wrote the (...) letter to Locke in which he posed the now famous question about a man born blind made to see, he was an active member of the DPS and was on familiar terms with several other key figures in Irish philosophy at the time. For the most part, Irish thinkers in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries answered “no” to Molyneux’s question of whether a blind man made to see could distinguish, by sight alone, between a cube and a sphere. (shrink)

"Manuel DeLanda is a distinguished writer, artist and philosopher. In his new book, he offers a fascinating look at how the contemporary world is characterized by an extraordinary social complexity. Since most social entities, from small communities to large nation-states, would disappear altogether if human minds ceased to exist, Delanda proposes a novel approach to social ontology that asserts the autonomy of social entities from the conceptions we have of them." Editorial.

In this paper I argue for a novel interpretation of Shepherd’s notion of selfhood. In distinction to Deborah Boyle’s interpretation, I contend that Shepherd differentiates between the mind and the self. The latter, for Shepherd, is an effect arising from causal interactions between mind and body – specifically those interactions that give rise to our present stream of consciousness, our memories, and that can unite these two. Thus, the body plays a constitutive role in the formation of the self. The (...) upshot of this interpretation is that it can dissolve the problem of individuating mind that Boyle identifies. Briefly, the problem consists in Shepherd seemingly individuating minds in terms of their associated bodies and bodies in terms of the minds they are united with. My interpretation, however, allows to see that Shepherd neither wants nor needs to individuate the mind in isolation of the body and to read the passages, in which the problem seems to arise, as being about what makes living beings individual – with mind and body both playing a crucial role in this context. (shrink)

Building Better Beings: A Theory of Moral Responsibility argues that the normative basis of moral responsibility is anchored in the effects of responsibility practices. Further, the capacities required for moral responsibility are socially scaffolded. This article considers criticisms of this account that have been recently raised by John Doris, Victoria McGeer, and Michael Robinson. Robinson argues against Building Better Beings’s rejection of libertarianism about free will, and the account of desert at stake in the theory. considers methodological questions that arise (...) from the account of desert, providing some additional resources for thinking about these issues within the framework of the account. McGeer objects to the particular mode of justification used to motivate the prescriptive aspect of the account. This article presents replies to each of these lines of response. (shrink)

Properly speaking, the corporation, considered as an entity distinct from its members, cannot be morally responsible for wrongful corporate acts. Setting aside (in this abstract) acts brought about through negligence or omissions, we may say that moral responsibility for an act attaches to that agent (or agents) in whom the act "originates" in this sense: (1) the agent formed the (mental) intention or plan to bring about that act (possibly with the help of others) and (2) the act was intentionally (...) brought about through bodily movements over which that agent had direct control (i.e. the kind of direct mental control that I have over the body I refer to as "my" body) and through which the agent carried out his (mental) intention or plan. Corporate acts do not thus originate in some corporate entity distinct from its members because the corporation has neither a mind to form intentions nor a body it directly controls: it lacks the proper mind/body unity. Instead, corporate acts originate in individual autonomous human beings who make up the corporation and who intentionally bring about corporate acts through their own bodily movements. Such human individuals, and not "the corporation," are morally responsible for corporate acts. Moreover, to say that an entity is "morally responsible" for a wrongful act is to say that the entity is liable to blame and punishment. But it is not possible to impose blame and punishment on a corporation without inflicting it on corporate members. Thus, to say that a corporation (as an entity distinct from its members) is "morally responsible" for a wrongful corporate act is to imply that a (possibly innocent) corporate member legitimately may be punished for something for which another entity was morally responsible. This violates the moral principles that underlie blame and punishment. To hold that the corporation can be morally responsible for its acts is to adopt a dangerous organicism. (shrink)

Many prominent accounts of free will and moral responsibility make use of the idea that agents can be responsive to reasons. Call such theories Reasons accounts. In what follows, I consider the tenability of Reasons accounts in light of situationist social psychology and, to a lesser extent, the automaticity literature. In the first half of this chapter, I argue that Reasons accounts are genuinely threatened by contemporary psychology. In the second half of the paper I consider whether such threats can (...) be met, and at what cost. Ultimately, I argue that Reasons accounts can abandon some familiar assumptions, and that doing so permits us to build a more empirically plausible picture of our agency. (shrink)

I address three topics. First, I argue that the issue of corporate moral responsibility is an important one for business ethics.Second, I examine a core argument for the claim that the corporate organization is a separate moral agent and show it is based on anunnoticed but elementary mistake deriving from the fallacy of division. Third, I examine the assumptions collectivists make about whatit means to say that organizations act and that they act intentionally and show that these assumptions are mistaken (...) in their failure to understand the nature of intentional causality and of “as-if” intentionality. In exposing these mistakes I set out my own view in the form oftwo theses, the first of which states that individual members of an organization are always causally responsible for any corporate act,and the second of which states that attributions of intentions to corporations are always either descriptive or prescriptive attributionsof “as if” intentionality. (shrink)

Revisionism in the theory of moral responsibility is the idea that some aspect of responsibility practices, attitudes, or concept is in need of revision. While the increased frequency of revisionist language in the literature on free will and moral responsibility is striking, what discussion there has been of revisionism about responsibility and free will tends to be critical. In this paper, I argue that at least one species of revisionism, moderate revisionism, is considerably more sophisticated and defensible than critics have (...) realized. I go on to argue for the advantages of moderate revisionist theories over standard compatibilist and incompatibilist theories. (shrink)

Through modern driver assistant systems, algorithmic decisions already have a significant impact on the behavior of vehicles in everyday traffic. This will become even more prominent in the near future considering the development of autonomous driving functionality. The need to consider ethical principles in the design of such systems is generally acknowledged. However, scope, principles and strategies for their implementations are not yet clear. Most of the current discussions concentrate on situations of unavoidable crashes in which the life of human (...) beings is existentially affected. In this paper, we argue that ethical considerations should be mandatory for any algorithmic decision of autonomous vehicles, instead of a limitation to hazard situations. Such an ethically aligned behavior is relevant because autonomous vehicles, like any other traffic participants, operate in a shared public space, where every behavioral decision impacts the operational possibilities of others. These possibilities concern the fulfillment of a road-user’s safety, utility and comfort needs. We propose that, to operate ethically in such space, an autonomous vehicle will have to take its behavior decisions according to a just distribution of operational possibilities among all traffic participants. Using an application on a partially-autonomous prototype vehicle, we describe how to apply and implement concepts of distributive justice to the driving environment and demonstrate the impact on its behavior in comparison to an advanced but egoistic decision maker. (shrink)

Este artículo analiza los desarrollos que Foucault realiza en torno a la analítica de la finitud en su libro Las palabras y las cosas con el fin de dilucidar las diferencias conceptuales con que Freud y Lacan abordan el sujeto del psicoanálisis. Se pretende reconocer la potencia de la crítica foucaulteana al cuadrilátero antropológico y revisar si las teorías de Freud y Lacan se encuentran o no dentro del mismo, buscando pensar la fecundidad de las direcciones contemporáneas del psicoanálisis. Resultados: (...) Foucault dejó en claro que es necesario prescindir del hombre para poder pensar de nuevo la realidad humana. Freud abrió las puertas de tal desaparición, aunque sus cimientos epistemológicos lo dejaron fijado a una antropología biologicista. Lacan retornó lingüísticamente a Freud para rescatar la potencia de su descubrimiento y formalizar un psicoanálisis cuyo sujeto no es el hombre. Orientaciones actuales del psicoanálisis parecen olvidar este último esfuerzo. (shrink)

Until quite recently, almost no philosophers trained in the continental tradition saw anything of value in realism. The situation in analytic philosophy was always different, but in continental philosophy realism was usually treated as a pseudo-problem. That is no longer the case. In this provocative new book, two leading philosophers examine the remarkable rise of realism in the continental tradition. While exploring the similarities and differences in their own positions, they also consider the work of others and assess rival trends (...) in contemporary philosophy. They begin by discussing the relation between realism and materialism, which DeLanda links closely but which Harman tries to separate. Part Two covers the many different meanings of realism, with the two authors working together to develop an expanded definition of the term. Part Three features a spirited exchange on the respective virtues and drawbacks of DeLanda's realism of attractors and singularities and Harman's object-oriented theory. Part Four shifts to the question of the knowability of the real, as the authors discuss whether scientific knowledge does full justice to reality. In Part Five, they shift the focus to space, time, and science more generally, and here Harman offers a defence of actor-network theory despite its obvious anti-realist elements. Lively, accessible and engaging, this book is the best attempt so far to clarify the different paths for realism in continental philosophy. It will be of great value to students and scholars of continental philosophy and to anyone interested in the cutting-edge debates in philosophy and critical theory today. (shrink)

In this article, after some thoughts on medieval logic and teaching, we present Thomas Murner’s text, Logica memorativa, showing some of his mnemonic strategies for the student to learn logic quickly. Murner offers a type of “flash cards” that illustrate much of the teaching of logic at the beginning of the sixteenth century. The first impression is visual, because the cards do not contain words that illustrate their content. Murner’s exposition rests on analogies between logic themes that are explained and (...) the visual images presented. (shrink)

‘British Empiricism’ is a name traditionally used to pick out a group of eighteenth-century thinkers who prioritised knowledge via the senses over reason or the intellect and who denied the existence of innate ideas. The name includes most notably John Locke, George Berkeley, and David Hume. The counterpart to British Empiricism is traditionally considered to be Continental Rationalism that was advocated by Descartes, Spinoza, and Leibniz, all of whom lived in Continental Europe beyond the British Isles and all embraced innate (...) ideas. This article characterizes empiricists more broadly as those thinkers who accept Locke’s Axiom that there is no idea in the mind that cannot be traced back to some particular experience. It includes British-Irish Philosophy from the seventeenth, eighteenth, and nineteenth century. As well as exploring the traditional connections among empiricism and metaphysics and epistemology, it examines how British empiricists dealt with issues in moral philosophy and the existence and nature of God. The article identifies some challenges to the standard understanding of British Empiricism by including early modern thinkers from typically marginalised groups, especially women. Finally, in showing that there is nothing uniquely British about being an empiricist, it examines a particular case study of the eighteenth-century philosopher Anton Wilhelm Amo, the first African to receive a doctorate in Europe. (shrink)

In this article I propose a resolution to the history issue for responsible agency, given a moderate revisionist approach to responsibility. Roughly, moderate revisionism is the view that a plausible and normatively adequate theory of responsibility will require principled departures from commonsense thinking. The history issue is whether morally responsible agency – that is, whether an agent is an apt target of our responsibility-characteristic practices and attitudes – is an essentially historical notion. Some have maintained that responsible agents must have (...) particular sorts of histories, others have argued that no such history is required. Resolution of this contentious issue is connected to a wide range of concerns, including the significance and culpability of different forms of manipulation, the plausibility of important incompatibilist criticisms of compatibilism, and of course, a satisfactory account of moral responsibility. As it turns out, history matters sometimes, but less frequently than we might think. (shrink)

Este artículo es una discusión con el concepto platónico de diálogo entendido como comedia, Plato’s Cratylus: The Comedy of Language (Ewegen, 2014. No hay traducción al español) fue usado como el recurso central de este artículo, el cual provee la base para diferentes interpretaciones en América Latina como las que defiende la profesora Buarque (2011) en nuestra región y, de manera mucho más general Gregorio Lury et al. (2018) en Ibero America. Sumado a ello, a diferencia del trabajo mencionado, este (...) trabajo lleva a cabo una comparación con la obra de Platón usando una metodología de carácter hermenéutico basado en los escritos de Platón y sus múltiples referencias a la risa a través de su reflexión escrita; se toma como punto de referencia la consigna hermenéutica de tomar la clara interpretación como un todo. El presente trabajo tiende entonces, a diferencia de la propuesta de Ewegen, a establecer el esfuerzo platónico mucho más próximo a a la tragedia que a la comedia como género de interpretación. Aunque existan secciones referidas enteramente a asuntos graciosos en los cuales el humor se aprecia, esta no puede ser la clave para la interpretación platónica como lo sostiene el enfoque de Ewegen. La forma del diálogo platónico debe ser entendida en un proyecto educativo, es decir de transformación. (shrink)

This article summarizes and extends the moderate revisionist position I put forth in Four Views on Free Will and responds to objections to it from Robert Kane, John Martin Fischer, Derk Pereboom, and Michael McKenna. Among the principle topics of the article are (1) motivations for revisionism, what it is, and how it is different from compatibilism and hard incompatibilism, (2) an objection to libertarianism based on the moral costs of its current epistemic status, (3) an objection to the distinctiveness (...) of semicompatibilism against conventional forms of compatibilism and (4) whether moderate revisionism is committed to realism about moral responsibility. (shrink)

La controversia sobre la pertinencia de la procreación asistida presenta numerosas aristas. Esto hace difícil saldar la discusión. Este artículo propone establecer una valoración de la fecundación médicamente asistida y de la maternidad subrogada a la luz del “requerimiento de afectación personal” (Parfit, 1991). La hipótesis presentada en el artículo sostiene que la afectación personal no conduce a prohibición pero crea un derecho en el niño resultante porque no puede obviarse el futuro derecho a la identidad. Para sostenerlo, se revisa (...) la afectación de las personas involucradas en el proceso y del niño por nacer. También, se evalúa las implicancias del “problema de no identidad” (Parfit, 1984) y del “interés superior del niño”. (shrink)

The Luck Problem has existed in one form or another since David Hume, at least. It is perhaps as old as Stoic objections to the Epicurean swerve. Although the general issue admits of different formulations with subtly different emphases, the characterization of it that will serve as my target focuses on “cross-worlds” luck, a kind of luck that arises when the decision-making of agents is indeterministic.